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Long-term Care Responsibility and its 
Opportunity Costs
Abstract
This paper analyzes the relationship between long-term care provision and the aver-
age individual wage rate. In addition, the eﬀ  ects of the number of hours spent on care-
giving on the probability of employment as well as on the number of hours worked are 
examined. Data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement (SHARE) of 2004 
and 2006 is used to analyze caregiving eﬀ  ects on the European labor market. Descrip-
tive statistics show a positive correlation between hours of care and the wage rate for 
those working. In the regression analysis, sample-selection models combined with 
instrumental-variable estimation are used to estimate the causal eﬀ  ects of hours of 
care on wages. The results illustrate that care for parents has a large negative impact 
on the individual’s wage rate. Test results show that controlling for sample selection 
is reasonable. Finally, the probability of employment is only decreased in the female 
sample. Although the hours worked are not signicantly aﬀ  ected.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: J11, J22, C01
Keywords: Informal care; labor-market outcomes; sample selection
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Europe will face multiple social and economic challenges from an ageing society in the
next decades. Population projections illustrate that the old-age dependency ratio will
be rising. The reasons for this development are the increasing life expectancy and the
decreasing fertility rate (OECD, 1998). Besides serious concerns about ﬁnancing health
and pension expenses in the wake of this development, possible long-term care needs of
the frail elderly are receiving more attention in calculating social security budgets. In
addition, this trend is aﬀected by more independent living arrangements, which results
in smaller household sizes. This further contributes to ﬁnancial insecurities as more
individuals may have to rely on formal care services if they become disabled in the
future.
Nevertheless, it is currently widely noticed that the majority of both potential carers
and care recipients prefer informal care to professional or institutional care (Huber and
Hennessy, 2005). Although professional services might be of better quality, the dignity
of the impaired individual and feelings of general reciprocity might be the main reasons
for this preference. In addition, the costs of professional and institutional care are often
higher than what the care recipients and their families can aﬀord to pay. Therefore,
a lot of people aﬀected will have to rely on public subsidies from (and beyond) long-
term care policy programs. At the same time, long-term care and disability policies
throughout Europe emphasize the importance of informal caregiving to relieve their
social security budget (Jenson and Jacobzone, 2000).
However, the opportunity costs of carers are usually not considered by care laws.
Like in the case of child care, employee-friendly work arrangements are often diﬃcult
to implement. Foregone earnings due to reasons like decreased productivity, foregone
pension entitlements, and less mobility through time constraints could lead to major
ﬁnancial opportunity costs to carers. This could then translate to a decrease in work
hours or in the termination of labor supply altogether (Fast et al., 1999). Thus, al-
though most potential caregivers would like to provide informal care, family members
in their late working life might be economically aﬀected to a quite large extent. There-
4fore, this study focuses on the current impact of informal care giving on their wages
and labor supply.
This paper extends the previous work of Bolin et al. (2008). I use an updated and
corrected version of data from the SHARE waves 1 (2004) and 2 (2006) which allows
me to additionally analyze data for Belgium, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Like in
Bolin et al. (2008), the sample is designed to analyze the provision of care to parents but
is not restricted to non-retired individuals as early retirement can also be interpreted as
a labor-supply decision which might be heavily aﬀected by care obligations. Therefore,
excluding retirees could underestimate the eﬀect that care provision might have on
labor-market outcomes. The endogenous relation between caregiving and employment
has to be addressed as well: individuals with relatively lower opportunity costs might
be more willing to provide care. On the other hand, more formal care services could be
bought if the caregivers’ opportunity costs were higher than the price of professional
services. Thus, I present instrumental-variable results to retrieve causal eﬀects of hours
of care on labor supply and wages. In contrast to Bolin et al. (2008), I account for the
selection into labor supply because ignoring the self-selection into employment could
result in inconsistent coeﬃcient estimates. To combine the methodological advantages
of both instrumental-variable estimation and sample selection, I correct the coeﬃcients
and standard errors of the respective hours of care variable. It is the ﬁrst time that
these two methods are jointly used for estimating labor-market decisions under care
obligations in a European context.
In Section 3, descriptive results illustrate that a substantial part of the sample is
occupied with caregiving to some extent while only a small fraction of individuals is
providing care for more than 20 hours per week. The participation rate of individuals
is decreasing with a rise in care hours though. A positive correlation between hours of
care and the wage rate for those working suggests that caregivers still keep their jobs
if their opportunity costs of losing their work place are high. However, the sample-
selection results with instrumental-variable regression show a negative impact of long-
term care on the individual’s wage rate. Therefore, individuals have to bear forgone
earnings when they provide care. Testing for the existence of a selection bias shows
5that controlling for sample selection is reasonable. The probability of employment is
only decreased in the female sample. The hours worked are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected
in any instrumental-variable regression though.
After a short literature review in Section 2, the construction of the dataset and
descriptive statistics are provided in Section 3. The empirical methods are explained
in Section 4 while their results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the
analysis.
2 Literature review
Evidence on the monetary opportunity costs of informal care is quite detailed for the
UK. Foregone earnings and wage diﬀerentials have been estimated systematically by
Heitmueller and Inglis (2004, 2007) and Carmichael and Charles (1998, 2003a,b). The
latter two authors use a Heckman two-stage procedure in all of their publications. In
their ﬁrst paper from 1998, Carmichael and Charles looked at women in the General
Household Survey (GHS). Women’s wages are depressed by 4% if they look after an
elderly individual in need of care. If more than 20 hours of care have to be provided,
this negative eﬀect amounts to 10%. Participation in the labor market is increased by
care responsibilities though, while work hours per week decrease by 1.7 hours. With
the GHS of 1990, Carmichael and Charles (2003b) ﬁnd that those who care for more
than 10 hours per week earn 10% less compared to carers who spend less time on
care. Individuals with less than 10 hours of care responsibilities also have to face a 6%
reduction in wages. This impact on women is also present in their ﬁrst publication from
2003 (Carmichael and Charles, 2003a). However, men only suﬀer from an indirect wage
eﬀect as far as their labor-force participation is concerned. Their wages are reduced
by as much as 18%. In addition, co-residential care has a twice-as-large negative
eﬀect on wages for men and even more for women compared to extra-residential care.
Heitmueller and Inglis (2004) use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for their
analyses and estimate that care for more than 20 hours per week has, in contrast to
any caregiving, a substantial negative eﬀect on employment of 13.58 percentage points
6(pp). Caring for parents has a positive eﬀect though (+ 11.9 pp) while caring for a
spouse has a negative impact as it leaves the carer with less choices for providing care (-
29.64 pp). The logarithmized hourly wage is also negatively aﬀected for carers who are
working. The incidence of care decreases hourly wages by 2.66% while an additional
year of care decreases it by 2.5%. In their 2007 paper, the authors have calculated
wage disadvantages which amount to 10 log pp for the overall sample and by 13 log pp
for females which mainly aﬀects those who received less than average hourly wages.
The only study from the US which looks at wages in relation to care provision
estimates a very low rise in daily provided care hours of 0.34% for a 1% increase in
the hourly wage rate for those informal caregivers who are working (White-Means and
Chang, 1994). Thus, the relation is at least not negative. This is also the only study
which uses hours of care as the dependent variable while the hourly wage rate is one
of the regressors.
Bolin et al. (2008) have conducted a labor-market analysis for some continental
European countries with the early SHARE data from 2004. Besides labor supply
outcomes, they also estimate the eﬀect of care hours on hourly wages for a sample
of employed individuals who might have care obligations towards an elderly parent.
However, instrumental-variable regression shows insigniﬁcant eﬀects only. Although I
also use SHARE data, the present study has several advantages over the methodology
and empirical method of Bolin et al. (2008). The latest release of the SHARE allows me
to use corrected survey data. Contrary to Bolin et al. (2008), I take the selection bias
into labor-market participation into account and estimate sample-selection models. I
account for the endogenous relationship between the dependent labor-market variables
and the hours-of-care regressor and conduct the necessary correction of standard errors
and marginal eﬀects. Fortunately, the new release of data brings about stronger F-
tests on weakness of instruments which enhances the likelihood of estimating unbiased
coeﬃcients in instrumental variable regression.
As far as the results on labor supply are concerned, empirical evidence on the
impact of informal care on the probability of employment and work hours of caregivers
is mixed for the US. The studies are diﬃcult to compare as results strongly depend
7on the dataset and sample methodology as well as on the deﬁnition of care variables.
On the one hand, Stone and Short (1990); Wolf and Soldo (1994), and Arber and
Ginn (1995) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of employment.1 On the other
hand, Ettner (1995, 1996), Doty et al. (1998), as well as Pezzin and Schone (1999) ﬁnd a
signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect in this respect. The latter two authors also detect a negative
eﬀect on work hours. While the estimated impact in the aforementioned studies is only
modest, Johnson and Lo Sasso (2000) calculate a relatively large signiﬁcant reduction
in work hours. If women increased informal care hours by 100 over the last twelve
months, work hours would be reduced by 459 hours in the same year.
First European evidence is presented by Viitanen (2005) with the European Com-
munity Household Panel (ECHP). However, she only ﬁnds a signiﬁcantly negative
impact on the employment probability for Germany. When Viitanen (2005) looks
at diﬀerent sub-samples by age and marital status, she discovers that the impact of
caregiving on labor-force participation is largest for women at mid-life as well as for
single women in some European countries. The already mentioned study by Bolin
et al. (2008) looks at caregiving for elderly parents living outside the respondent’s own
household. The probability of employment is reduced by 3.7 pp and weekly work hours
by 0.26% for a 10% increase in weekly hours of care.2 While the impact on labor-force
participation is also signiﬁcantly negative in gender-speciﬁc estimation, this is not the
case as far as work hours are concerned.
Evidence from German Socio-Economic Panel data (SOEP) illustrates that care
provision within households does not inﬂuence the employment probability but has a
signiﬁcantly negative impact on actual work hours in panel linear probability models
which account for unobserved heterogeneity by using ﬁxed eﬀects. The eﬀect is, how-
ever, small as work hours are only reduced by about half an hour for men as well as
women (Meng, 2009).
1For a more detailed and extended literature review see, Meng (2009).
2Bolin et al. (2008) say that the eﬀect of a 10% increase in weekly hours of care leads to a 2.6%
decrease in weekly work hours. However, the log-log speciﬁcation of variables and the coeﬃcient of
-0.026 suggests that the coeﬃcient has been misinterpreted.
83 Methodology and descriptive statistics
This paper analyzes data on 13 European countries from the Survey of Health, Ageing
and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). SHARE is a multidisciplinary panel database of
micro data on health, socio-economic status, and social as well as family networks of
more than 30,000 individuals aged 50 or over. The ﬁrst wave was collected in 2004
with eleven participating European countries. Three additional countries joined the
sample in 2006 and 2007 when the second wave of SHARE was surveyed. For details
on the sampling procedure, questionnaire contents, and ﬁeldwork methodology, readers
are referred to B¨ orsch-Supan and J¨ urges (2005).
I use data from both waves available in SHARE. Pooled estimation with cluster-
robust standard errors in households is used here as the variation, necessary for panel
ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation, is too low in the data. I look at children who might give assis-
tance to elderly parents living outside their own household where assistance is deﬁned
as needing care in Activities of Daily Living (ADL; e.g., bathing, dressing, eating, using
the toilet), in Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL; e.g., shopping, laundry,
food preparation, medication), and paperwork. Unfortunately, the impact of impaired
individuals living in the carer’s household cannot be analyzed in detail as the SHARE
questionnaire does not ask for care hours and types of help in this respect. I restrict
the data set to individuals aged 50 to 65 which is the oﬃcial retriement age in most
European countries. Contrary to Bolin et al. (2008), early retirees are not deleted in
this analysis as the decision for early retirement is also a labor-supply decision which
can be related to caregiving. In this study, I concentrate on a joint sample of men
and women as well as on a sample where only women are included. I refrain from
estimating separate results for men as instrumental-variable estimation for them alone
is not reliable enough due to a weak correlation of the instruments with the endogenous
regressor. Knowledge on the long-term care impact on labor and wages for men would
have to remain incomplete which can also be seen in the results presented in the study
of Bolin et al. (2008). One reason for this might lie in an unequal occupation of men
and women with long-term care. Although a similar percentage of men reports to care
9for a frail elderly, they are often not the primary caregiver. In addition, women usually
provide help with heavier tasks of daily living while men are predominatly occupied
with household maintenance (Jenson and Jacobzone, 2000).
Before turning to the estimation procedure, a descriptive overview of labor-market
participation and the average hourly gross wage rate over the distribution of care hours
is presented in Table 1. The statistics are based on the sample that allows individuals
to care for their parents only. Means and standard deviations for all variables can be
found in Table 5 in the Appendix.
Table 1: A positive correlation between wages and care hours
Self-assessed care Number of carers Participation Average wage rate
hours per week (% of all carers) rate of carers per hour (in ¤)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Less than 5 58.01 65.22 16.52
5t o9 17.27 44.53 17.89
10 to 19 11.75 35.71 17.75
20 to 29 6.57 26.06 19.37
30 to 39 2.27 15.38 22.45
40 to 49 1.78 21.57 21.21
50 or more 2.10 21.67 25.99
All carers (2,860) 28.16 (1,507) 35.78 17.06
Non carers (7,298) 71.84 (2,705) 64.22 17.88
Full sample (10,158) 100 (4,212) 41.46
Notes: For wages: Average over those working.
Source: SHARE 2004, 2006.
In this sample, 28% out of 10,158 children report to care for one or two of their
parents. The hours that are spent on helping either with ADL, IADL, or paperwork
decline steadily with the number of care hours. As can be seen in Column 2 of Table 1,
nearly 90% of caregivers provide care for less than 20 hours per week. The participation
rate of carers in the labor market also diminishes over the care hour categories although
it remains fairly stable for those who care for more than 40 hours per week. This is
in line with what one would expect when the care burden increases: individuals who
are obliged to give care either stop working or those individuals who are unemployed
are more likely to supply a higher amount of care hours. This endogenous relation
10Table 2: A positive correlation between wages and care hours - Women
Self-assessed care Number of carers Participation Average wage rate
hours per week (% of all carers) rate of carers p e rh o u r( i n¤)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Less than 5 52.41 59.13 14.88
5t o9 17.60 38.68 18.14
10 to 19 13.56 32.24 19.49
20 to 29 8.47 22.22 21.72
30 to 39 2.88 11.54 20.24
40 to 49 2.38 18.60 26.17
50 or more 2.43 18.18 20.94
All carers (1,807) 29.85 (819) 39.26 16.29
Non carers (4,247) 70.15 (1,267) 60.74 16.60
Whole subsample (6,054) 100 (2,086) 34.46
Notes: For wages: Average over those working.
Source: SHARE 2004, 2006.
between employment and care has to be scrutinized further in the empirical analysis.
Overall, 41.46% of sample members provide care and are employed at the same time.
Column 4 presents their average wages. It increases over the care hour categories.
While the lowest category receives an average wage of ¤16.52 per hour, it rises to
more than ¤21 for those who care for more than 30 hours per week. As these numbers
illustrate correlations, some children who care for a parent seem to stay in the labor
market because they receive high earnings. The average wage for the whole sample of
non-caring individuals is ¤17.88 per hour. The average wage of those who are working
and caring is somewhat lower and reaches ¤17.06 per hour. Therefore, I expect to ﬁnd
no or only a modest signiﬁcant eﬀect of care hours on wages in the empirical analysis.
Table 2 illustrates a similar descriptive statistics for the 6,054 women in the sample.
The distribution of caring and working individuals shows the same trends as in the full-
sample case. The variation in wages is larger though. The participation rate of women
who provide care is 3.5 pp higher than in the full sample (Column 3). However, the
overall labor force participation rate is about 7 pp lower for women (Column 4). The
average wage rates are lower by about ¤1. Like in the full sample, wages rise with
care-hour categories.
114 Empirical methods
4.1 Dependent and independent variables
The ﬁrst dependent variable which has to be considered in the analysis is a binary
indicator of labor-force participation (lfp). It takes on the value of one if the individual
is employed and zero otherwise. With a second dependent variable, which contains the
number of contractual hours worked per week (workh), the analysis sheds light on some
additional information on what the impact of care on employment implies in terms of
work hours. However, this equation is not used in the sample-selection model. The
third dependent variable is the logarithmised wage rate (lnwage). It is the ratio of the
individual’s gross labor income and its contractual working time.
The logarithmized household income of all household members except the respective
individual is one of the exogenous variables of the ﬁrst and second regression equations.
It is available in the SHARE data and used here to minimize the potential endogenous
relationship with the dependent variable as it is diﬃcult to instrument household in-
come. Along with the other’s household income, the household size, the number as
well as the mean age of children, it is only included into the probability-of-employment
equation to better identify the sample-selection model. Other control variables are the
age and age squared of the individuals, a dummy which shows if they are married and
if they are in bad health. Furthermore, the highest level of schooling is captured by
a set of dummy variables which are oﬀered in ISCED-97 coding in the SHARE data.
The degree of urbanisation3 as well as country dummies are included to capture insti-
tutional labor market, care policy, and cultural diﬀerences in Europe. As I use pooled
data for regression, a dummy labelling the year 2004 as 0 and the year 2006 as 1 is also
included. All monetary values are adjusted by the SHARE data’s purchasing power
parity index to make the monetary cross-country values comparable to each other. The
main interest lies in the care variable which is restricted to non-co-residential care. I
use weekly hours of care which comprises the general information on the number of
3The base category city is deﬁned as a big city or the suburbs and outskirts of a big city. The
category town consists of large and small towns. The category village is deﬁned as a village or rural
area.
12hours per week in which an individual provides care to one or both of its parents.
The ﬁrst and second equation are both regressed on the same set of explanatory
variables. However, the characteristics of children as well as the household size and the
other’s household income are not included into the third regression equation to identify
the sample-selection model. Both variables which are measured in hours are restricted
to a maximum of 112 hours per week to mitigate measurement error and, in the case
of care provision, the problem of double counting.
4.2 Potential endogeneity problem
The care-hours variable is an endogenous regressor. Therefore, it has to be instru-
mented to retrieve unbiased estimates on labor-market outcomes. Several reasons for
an endogeneity problem between care and labor supply (and therefore also wages)
are possible. First, individuals can be reluctant to give many care hours if they are
employed because they take their higher opportunity cost into account. Second, this
argument does not only hold for starting care provision but also for an increase in
its time burden. Third, it can be advantageous to purchase formal care services if its
price is lower than the opportunity cost of the otherwise care giving individual. This
argument does not only hold for the binary labor-force-participation-dummy but also
for working hours and the wage rate.
Although one would expect that coeﬃcients without instrumental-variable (IV)
estimation are underestimated when looking at care and labor supply and wages only,
this is not clear at the outset in multiple regression analysis. This can also be seen in
the literature that uses instruments in this respect. Two studies using American data
(Stern, 1995; Ettner, 1996) as well as the paper using German SOEP data (Meng, 2009)
ﬁnd that the eﬀect of care on work hours is only signiﬁcantly negative if instruments
for the care variable are used. In Ettner (1995), the eﬀect becomes smaller when
endogeneity is considered. The study on British data of Heitmueller (2007), on the
contrary, ﬁnds no signiﬁcant eﬀect of extra-residential care after instruments are used.
In the study of Bolin et al. (2008) with the SHARE data, coeﬃcients for care giving
outside the own household turn insigniﬁcant when using IV estimation.
13An instrument has to be highly correlated with care provision but has to be un-
related to the labor-supply decision and wages. Like Bolin et al. (2008), I use binary
information on having a mother or father in bad health as instruments. First of all,
parents are the most likely care recipients next to an individual’s spouse. Second, a bad
health status of parents is likely to increase hours of care as the potential caregivers are
at least 50 years old. Consequently, the youngest parents are about 70 years old and
they are fairly likely to become impaired in personal and everyday activities. Third,
it is not problematic that both the probability of having a parent in bad health and
leaving the labor force is increasing with the child’s age as age is one of the control
variables. These instruments are in addition not correlated with the error term of the
respective regression equation as the health status of parents is exogenous and not
aﬀected by the labor-supply decision or wages of children.
Table 3 illustrates that the instruments are strong enough over the diﬀerent care-
hour speciﬁcations and samples in the regression models. Their (joint) F-statistic is
above 10 and, therefore, fulﬁlls the rule of thumb regarding weak instruments (Staiger
and Stock, 1997).
Table 3: Endogeneity test results conﬁrm a substantial correlation to care hours
Labor force Work hours Hourly wage
participation per week rate (log)
Full sample χ2(2) χ2(1) F(1, 3559)
Weekly hours of care
F-test on weakness of instruments 110.17 23.70 16.69
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Women χ2(2) χ2(1) F(1, 1960)
Weekly hours of care
F-test on weakness of instruments 97.45 16.96 10.62
(0.000) (0.000) (0.034)
SHARE 2004, 2006.
The χ2-statistic has to be divided by the degrees of freedom to compute the F-statistic.
144.3 Estimation procedure
An OLS regression of the wage-rate equation for those being employed could lead to
inconsistent coeﬃcients due to sample selection. Therefore, I take the probability of be-
ing in paid employment into account. I follow the classical sample-selection approach of
Heckman (1976, 1979). The equation which has the binary labor-force-participation in-
dicator as its dependent variable is the selection equation while the wage-rate equation
is named the outcome equation. Although this model is identiﬁed by its distributional
assumptions, I follow Smith and Blundell (1986) and additionally identify the model
with the other household member’s income as well as with general household charac-
teristics, namely the household size, the number of children and their overall mean
age.
The coeﬃcents and standard errors of the wage-rate equation need to be corrected.
To combine the sample-selection approach with the instrumental-variable estimation,
I predict the care variable from the ﬁrst stage instrumental variable regression and
then insert the predicted value  careivji, with j =1 ,2, i =1 ...n, into the selection
and outcome equation before estimating the sample-selection system. The selection-
correction model thus reads as
lfp1i = cons
 
1i ∗ β11 +  careiv 
1i ∗ β12 + exo
 
1i ∗ β13 + hh
 
1i ∗ β14 + e1i
lnwage2i = cons
 
2i ∗ β21 +  careiv 
2i ∗ β22 + exo
 
2i ∗ β23 + s12 ∗ λ(x
 
1i ∗  β1)+e2i
(1)
where consji is a constant and exoji denotes all exogenous variables except for the
predicted hours of care regressor  careivji and the instruments that help identify the
selection-correction model hh1i. λ(x 
1i ∗  β1) is the estimated inverse Mills ratio and a
Wald test on the hypothesis s12 = 0 (or rho = s12/s2) is used to test whether the
error terms of the two regression equations eji are correlated. If the null hypothesis is




i ∗ β1 +  careiv 
i ∗ β2 + exo
 
i ∗ β3 + hh
 
i ∗ β4 + ei (2)
To assess the signiﬁcance of hours of care, I then correct the standard errors from the
15predicted hours of care variable to compute appropriate t-statistics by a standard-error-
correction method presented in Gujarati (2003). It weights the estimated standard
error of  careivji with a ratio of the unpredicted to predicted standard deviation of the
outcome equation’s regression error:4
 secareiv2i
 se  careiv2i
In addition, the conditional marginal eﬀects of the wage-rate equation that are pre-
sented in the following tables are corrected for the selection eﬀect by using the delta
method (Vance, 2009). If the selection and outcome equation are correlated with each
other, it would be incorrect to interpret the coeﬃcient of the outcome equation alone
(Sigelman and Zeng, 1999).
For calculating the eﬀect on contractual work hours per week, tobit and instrumen-
tal variables tobit estimators are used for those actually working. All regressions are
conducted with pooled data and cluster-robust standard errors by households (Moul-
ton, 1986).
5 The eﬀects of long-term care on labor market
outcomes
Table 4 presents the eﬀects of weekly hours of care on the three diﬀerent dependent
variables respresenting labor supply, namely being in paid employment or not, con-
tractual work hours, and the logarithmized wage rate. The results only illustrate the
eﬀect of caregiving for parents. Even column numbers illustrate the results for the
respective instrumental-variable estimation which are the results of most interest here
as they allow me to present causal eﬀects. Complete estimation results can be found
in Table 6 and Table 7 in the Appendix.
4The standard errors of all coeﬃcients in the outcome equation are automatically corrected for the
two-stage estimation procedure in the selection-correction model by Stata’s heckman command.
16Table 4: The wage rate is negatively aﬀected for children who care for their parents
Employment Employment Work hours Work hours Wage rate Wage rate
IV IV (log) (log) IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample
Weekly hours −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.049∗∗ −0.333 0.001 −0.037∗∗∗
of care (0.001) (0.006) (0.022) (0.253) (0.002) (0.013)
Rho 37.70 38.54
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 10,158 10,158 4,212 4,212 10,158 10,158
Female sample
Weekly hours −0.003∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗ −0.051∗ −0.256 0.001 −0.027∗
of care (0.001) (0.005) (0.030) (0.267) (0.003) (0.015)
Rho 31.44 33.30
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 6,054 6,054 2,086 2,086 6,054 6,054
SHARE 2004, 2006. All columns present marginal eﬀects.
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) present sample selection model results.
See Table 6 and Table 7 in the Appendix for full results.
Column (2) and (4) show that the coeﬃcients of weekly hours of care for the binary
labor-supply equation and for the work-hour regression are insigniﬁcant in the IV
regression equations. Both coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly negative when mere correlations
are considered (Columns (1), (3)). Caring for ten more hours per week decreases the
probability of employment by 3 pp and is therefore economically small. Column (3)
illustrates that caring ten hours more per week is associated with a 29 minutes decline
in work hours which is of small economic importance as well.
Like in the British empirical results (Carmichael and Charles, 1998, 2003a,b; Heit-
mueller and Inglis, 2004, 2007), a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect of weekly hours of care
on the log wage rate is detected in Column (6) which does account for the endogenous
relation between care and opportunity costs. Caring one more hours per week decreases
the wage rate by 3.7%. This eﬀect is in line with the British ﬁndings. As Columns (5)
and (6) present conditional marginal eﬀects from a sample selection estimation, this
result shows the eﬀect for those individuals who are working. The carergivers among
17them thus seem to be less productive than the employees who do not provide care.
The IV regression results of the female sample are slighlty diﬀerent form the full
sample. Here, the probability of employment decreases by 10 pp for caring ten more
hours a week. The impact on work hours in Column (4) is again insigniﬁcant. The wage
rate is less aﬀected by care provision though. It decreases by 2.7% for an additional
care hour. It is either less for women than in the full sample because women tend to
leave their jobs more often or because they might achieve a reconciliation of work and
care more easily.
The results on labor supply are similar to the results of Bolin et al. (2008) as far
as non-IV regression results are concerned. While the probability of employment in
Bolin et al.’s sample is reduced by 3.7 pp for a ten-percent increase in care hours, it
is decreased by 3 pp in this sample. The same is true for the female sample. The
impact on work hours is relatively large in this study but still economically small. It is
0.26% for a ten percent increase in care hours around its mean in Bolin et al.’s study
and 2.57% for those working in the present paper.5 This can be expected as I do not
use OLS but a tobit model for estimation. The diﬀerence between our results becomes
larger when looking at women only. Contrary to their ﬁnding, the eﬀect of care on
the probability of employment in Column (2) is still signiﬁcantly negative under IV
regression. However, the most important diﬀerence in both samples is the negative
impact that care provision of children to their parents has on the logarithmised wage
rate. While Bolin et al. (2008) do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect, an additional hour of
care does lower the wage rate signiﬁcantly in the present paper.
Overall, the marginal eﬀects of the sample-selection models are economically sig-
niﬁcant and illustrate that an increased care burden leads to a substantial increase in
opportunity costs due to foregone earnings. The Wald test on the correlation between
the error terms of the selection and outcome equation do rejected the null hypothesis
of independent equations for any of the speciﬁcations.
Other regressors of the three dependent variables provide some additional insight
5The mean of hours of care and work hours for those working in the full sample are 1.84 and 35.02,
respectively. The eﬀect for a 10% increase is thus calculated as −0.049 × 10 × (1.84/35.02) × 100 =
−2.57.
18into the labor supply behavior of European individuals older than 50. I discuss only
IV regression coeﬃcients in the following. Gender has a negative eﬀect of 22 pp on
the employment probability. Age has a positive eﬀect. As can be expected, being
in bad health leads to a drop in labor-force participation as well. The decrease is
substantial and as large as 28 pp. A higher educational degree raises the probability
of employment. An additional child has only a modest negative eﬀect of 1 pp which is
not surprising in a sample of individuals who are older than 50. Living in a town or
village compared to a big city, leads to a reduction in labor supply by 5 pp. Women
work more than 5 hours less than men in the full sample. Being married or in bad
health leads to a drop in working time of a little bit more than 1 hour. A negative
eﬀect can also be found for living in a town. The impact is only small though. The
wage rate is 16.9% less for women. Those who are married are paid 5.7% less than
other employees. Bad health does not seem to lead to lower payments due to decreased
productivity. The eﬀect of age is not signiﬁcant. Having an upper tertiary degree after
the ISCED 97-scale, rises the wage rate by more than 50%. There is no wage eﬀect for
individuals living in a town or village.
Contrary to the full sample, being married has a negative eﬀect of 4 pp on the
probability of employment in the sample of women. However, a wage eﬀect cannot be
found. The highest ISCED 97 degree leads to a larger rise in wages of 60%, about 10 pp
more than in the full sample. The eﬀect of being in bad health has a similar negative
eﬀect on labor supply for women as in the full sample. However, the negative impact
of the number of children is larger. It is likely that the eﬀect of children represents a
lock-in eﬀect which persists since the woman gave birth to her children. The impacts
of living in a town or village compared to a city is more diﬀerentiated in the female
sample where living in a village has a more negative impact.
6 Conclusion
The analysis here looks at the impact that care provision to elderly parents has on
the labor supply of their caregiving children. Data from the SHARE is used which
19interviews individuals who are older than 50 only and who, therefore, are more likely
to be burdened by caregiving responsibilities. Labor supply is measured as a binary
decision to participate in the labor market, as well as by the contractual number
of hours that are oﬀered. The impact on the individual’s wage rate is assessed by
estimating sample-selection models. After a detailed descriptive analysis of the relation
between long-term care and employment, diﬀerent samples consisting of both men and
women and of women only are estimated using the number of weekly hours of care as
the main explanatory variable of interest.
The descriptive analysis illustrates that about 28% of children in the dataset care
for a parent while 41% of them are employed at the same time. The majority of
caregivers cares for less than 20 hours a week. The participation rate among aﬀected
individuals is decreasing with a rise in hours of care. A positive trend is found in
the average wage rate of working individuals. This could have several reasons. First,
individuals could be reluctant to exit their jobs although their caregiving burden rises
because their opportunity costs are high. Second, those who keep on working might
be more productive and thus they are able to reconcile care provision and work in the
labor market. Third, this could be promoted by ﬂexible work arrangements. All these
data characteristics are also found if only women are considered for the analysis.
Contrary to Bolin et al. (2008), coeﬃcients of hours of care in the wage rate re-
gression from instrumental-variable estimation are signiﬁcant. Given the test statistic
obtained in this study, the estimate of the causal impact here seems more reliable.
Care for parents only leads to a signiﬁcant deacrease in the probability of employment
for women by 10%. The hours worked are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected. When I combine
sample selection and IV methods, the average individual wage rate is falling consider-
ably: caring an additional hour decreases the wage rate by 3.7% in the full sample and
by 2.7% when only women are considered. Therefore, the positive descriptive correla-
tion cannot be found in the causal analysis. In addition, testing for independence of
equations in the selection-correction model shows that correcting for sample selection
is reasonable.
Overall, it can be concluded that those who are only slightly aﬀected by care respon-
20sibilities have only small diﬃculties in arranging work and care in their time schedule.
Therefore, it should be analyzed if leisure time is more likely to be reduced. For chil-
dren looking after their frail parents, the loss in wages is huge. This could not only
result from a loss in productivity but also from a job change due to a forced change
in the living arrangement or region where the child works. Future research should
therefore focus on the eﬀect that caregiving has on these two aspects. However, this
is only reasonable with longer panel data. Another interesting aspect which is worth
looking at is the impact of care on early retirement decisions of potential caregivers.
Some aspects of care policies in Europe are already designed to ﬁnancially disburden
the caregiver. Direct care allowance payments to care providers or contributions to
their retirement schemes are the leading examples. However, it is not known if these
measures are suﬃcient to compensate the loss in foregone earnings. This is also the case
because individual out-of-pocket costs of caring for another person are not seriously
surveyed yet.
21References
Arber, S. and Ginn, J. (1995), ‘Gender diﬀerences in the relationship between paid
employment and informal care’, Work Employment Society 9(3), 445–471.
Bolin, K., Lindgren, B. and Lundborg, P. (2008), ‘Your next of kin or your own ca-
reer?: Caring and working among the 50+ of Europe’, Journal of Health Economics
27(3), 718–738.
B¨ orsch-Supan, A. and J¨ urges, H. (2005), The Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement
in Europe - Methodology, Mannheim: MEA.
Carmichael, F. and Charles, S. (1998), ‘The labour market costs of community care’,
Journal of Health Economics 17(6), 747–765.
Carmichael, F. and Charles, S. (2003a), ‘Beneﬁt payments, informal care and female
labour supply.’, Applied Economics Letters 10(7), 411.
Carmichael, F. and Charles, S. (2003b), ‘The opportunity costs of informal care: does
gender matter?’, Journal of Health Economics 22(5), 781–803.
Doty, P., Jackson, M. E. and Crown, W. (1998), ‘The impact of female caregivers’
employment status on patterns of formal and informal eldercare’, The Gerontologist
38(3), 331–341.
Ettner, S. L. (1995), ‘The impact of ”Parent care” on female labor supply decisions’,
Demography 32(1), 63–80.
Ettner, S. L. (1996), ‘The opportunity costs of elder care’, The Journal of Human
Resources 31(1), 189–205.
Fast, J. E., Williamson, D. L. and Keating, N. C. (1999), ‘The hidden costs of informal
elder care’, Journal of Family and Economic Issues 20(3), 301–326.
Gujarati, D. N. (2003), Basic Econometrics, McGraw-Hill, Boston [u.a.].
22Heckman, J. J. (1976), ‘The common structure of statistical models of truncation,
sample selection and limited dependent variables and a simple estimator for such
models’, Annals of Economic and Social Measurement 5(4), 475–492.
Heckman, J. J. (1979), ‘Sample selection bias as a speciﬁcation error’, Econometrica
47(1), 153–161.
Heitmueller, A. (2007), ‘The chicken or the egg?: Endogeneity in labour market partic-
ipation of informal carers in England’, Journal of Health Economics 26(3), 536–559.
Heitmueller, A. and Inglis, K. (2004), ‘Carefree? participation and pay diﬀerentials for
informal carers in Britain’, IZA Discussion Paper No. 1273, 1–54.
Heitmueller, A. and Inglis, K. (2007), ‘The earnings of informal carers: Wage diﬀeren-
tials and opportunity costs’, Journal of Health Economics 26(4), 821–841.
Huber, M. and Hennessy, P. (2005), Long Term Care for Older People, The OECD
Health Project, OECD, Paris.
Jenson, J. and Jacobzone, S. (2000), ‘Care allowances for the frail elderly and their
impact on women Care-Givers’. OECD Labour Market and Social Policy Occasional
Papers No. 41.
Johnson, R. W. and Lo Sasso, A. T. (2000), ‘The trade-oﬀ between hours of paid
employment and time assistance to elderly parents at midlife’, The Urban Institute
pp. 1–40.
Meng, A. (2009), ‘Informal home care and labor force participation of household mem-
bers’, Ruhr Economic Papers 152, 1–38.
Moulton, B. R. (1986), ‘Random group eﬀects and the precision of regression estimates’,
Journal of Econometrics 32(3), 385–397.
OECD (1998), Maintaining Prosperity in an Ageing Society, OECD, Paris.
23Pezzin, L. E. and Schone, B. S. (1999), ‘Intergenerational household formation, fe-
male labor supply and informal caregiving: A bargaining approach’, The Journal of
Human Resources 34(3), 475–503.
Sigelman, L. and Zeng, L. (1999), ‘Analyzing censored and Sample-Selected data with
tobit and heckit models’, Political Analysis 8(2), 167–182.
Smith, R. J. and Blundell, R. W. (1986), ‘An exogeneity test for a simultaneous equa-
tion tobit model with an application to labor supply’, Econometrica 54(3), 679–685.
Staiger, D. and Stock, J. H. (1997), ‘Instrumental variables regression with weak in-
struments’, Econometrica 65(3), 557–586.
Stern, S. (1995), ‘Estimating family long-term care decisions in the presence of endoge-
nous child characteristics’, The Journal of Human Resources 30(3), 551–580.
Stone, R. I. and Short, P. F. (1990), ‘The competing demands of employment and
informal caregiving to disabled elders’, Medical Care 28(6), 513–526.
Vance, C. (2009), ‘Marginal eﬀects and signiﬁcance testing with heckman’s sample
selection model: a methodological note.’, Applied Economics Letters 16(14), 1415–
1419.
Viitanen, T. K. (2005), ‘Informal elderly care and women’s labour force participation
across Europe’, ENEPRI Research Report (No. 13).
White-Means, S. and Chang, C. (1994), ‘Informal caregivers’ leisure time and stress’,
Journal of Family and Economic Issues 15(2), 117–136.
Wolf, D. A. and Soldo, B. J. (1994), ‘Married women’s allocation of time to employment
and care of elderly parents’, The Journal of Human Resources 29(4), 1259–1276.
24Appendix
Table 5: Descriptive summary statistics
All individuals Employed caregivers only
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Employed 0.41 0.49 1.00 0.00
Wage rate in ¤(PPP) 7.29 18.22 17.06 24.07
Work hours per week 14.54 18.33 34.30 9.25
Weekly hours of care 2.37 8.00 5.15 9.60
Married 0.80 0.40 0.81 0.39
Age 57.30 3.85 55.19 3.09
Bad health 0.18 0.39 0.05 0.21
Primary school 0.20 0.40 0.06 0.23
Secondary school 0.54 0.50 0.54 0.50
Tertiary school 0.26 0.44 0.40 0.49
Other household 0.12 1.03 0.16 1.23
income (log)
Household size 2.46 1.06 2.47 1.01
Number of children 2.04 1.26 1.97 1.16
Mean age of children 24.68 10.77 22.20 10.26
Lives in urban area 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.50
Lives in a small town 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
Lives in a village 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.42
Germany 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.30
Austria 0.05 0.23 0.02 0.15
Sweden 0.10 0.30 0.20 0.40
Netherlands 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.34
Spain 0.06 0.24 0.02 0.14
Italy 0.10 0.29 0.04 0.18
France 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29
Denmark 0.07 0.26 0.14 0.35
Greece 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.21
Switzerland 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.22
Belgium 0.14 0.34 0.11 0.31
Poland 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.11
Czech Republic 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.18
Observations 10,158 1,507
25Table 6: Eﬀects of care to parents on labor market outcomes of children
Employment Employment Work hours Work hours Wage rate Wage rate
IV IV (log) (log) IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weekly hours of −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.049∗∗ −0.333 0.001 −0.037∗∗∗
care for parents (0.001) (0.006) (0.022) (0.253) (0.002) (0.013)
Female −0.222∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗ −5.884∗∗∗ −5.595∗∗∗ −0.223∗∗∗ −0.169∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.289) (0.405) (0.028) (0.033)
Married 0.001 0.000 −1.081∗∗∗ −1.125∗∗∗ −0.052 −0.057∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.382) (0.392) (0.032) (0.032)
Age 0.481∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ −0.187 0.193 −0.148 −0.109
(0.052) (0.052) (1.356) (1.414) (0.140) (0.140)
Age squared −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001)
Bad health −0.284∗∗∗ −0.284∗∗∗ −1.189∗ −1.202∗ 0.015 0.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.626) (0.645) (0.069) (0.069)
Secondary school 0.143∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ −0.358 −0.115 0.184∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.546) (0.586) (0.048) (0.050)
Tertiary school 0.310∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ −0.870 −0.622 0.490∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.569) (0.609) (0.052) (0.054)
Other household −0.006 −0.006 −0.013 −0.036
income (log) (0.005) (0.005) (0.087) (0.089)
Household size −0.004 −0.004 −0.292∗ −0.245
(0.007) (0.007) (0.166) (0.176)
Number of −0.010∗ −0.010∗ 0.033 0.009
children (0.006) (0.006) (0.138) (0.142)
Mean age −0.001 −0.001 −0.008 −0.006
of children (0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.018)
Time dummy −0.189∗∗∗ −0.189∗∗∗ −1.055∗∗∗ −1.092∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.319) (0.327) (0.039) (0.039)
L i v e si na −0.050∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.935∗∗∗ −0.811∗∗ 0.015 0.038
small town (0.015) (0.015) (0.342) (0.368) (0.035) (0.035)
Lives in −0.035∗∗ −0.035∗∗ −0.423 −0.506 −0.013 −0.010
a village (0.015) (0.016) (0.382) (0.400) (0.035) (0.035)




Observations 10,158 10,158 4,212 4,212 10,158 10,158
Wald chi2(27) 773.16
Chi-squared 2,467.97 2,459.69 773.16 14,138.01 14,128.05
SHARE 2004, 2006. All columns present marginal eﬀects.
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) present sample selection model results.
26Table 7: Eﬀects of care to parents on labor market outcomes of children - Women
Employment Employment Work hours Work hours Wage rate Wage rate
IV IV (log) (log) IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weekly hours of −0.003∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.051∗ −0.256 0.001 −0.027∗
care for parents (0.001) (0.005) (0.030) (0.267) (0.003) (0.015)
Married −0.042∗∗ −0.042∗∗ −2.082∗∗∗ −2.086∗∗∗ −0.059 −0.059
(0.019) (0.019) (0.522) (0.529) (0.042) (0.042)
Age 0.345∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ −0.394 0.265 −0.206 −0.147
(0.058) (0.058) (1.963) (2.167) (0.191) (0.192)
Age squared −0.003∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.005 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.019) (0.002) (0.002)
Bad health −0.218∗∗∗ −0.218∗∗∗ −1.076 −1.009 −0.002 0.003
(0.014) (0.014) (0.808) (0.837) (0.100) (0.099)
Secondary school 0.120∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ −0.087 0.136 0.260∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.912) (0.940) (0.072) (0.075)
Tertiary school 0.302∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ −0.002 0.198 0.571∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.931) (0.946) (0.077) (0.081)
Other household −0.005 −0.005 0.086 0.053
income (log) (0.007) (0.007) (0.159) (0.161)
Household size −0.019∗∗ −0.019∗∗ −0.532∗ −0.480∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.277) (0.291)
Number of −0.022∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ 0.269 0.274
children (0.007) (0.007) (0.210) (0.212)
Mean age 0.001 0.001 −0.024 −0.019
of children (0.001) (0.001) (0.026) (0.027)
Time dummy −0.168∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗ −0.771 −0.894∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.488) (0.521) (0.057) (0.057)
Lives in −0.031∗ −0.026 −1.351∗∗∗ −1.306∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
a small town (0.017) (0.017) (0.520) (0.533) (0.050) (0.051)
Lives in −0.038∗∗ −0.036∗∗ −0.98 −1.148∗ 0.008 0.016
a village (0.017) (0.017) (0.606) (0.664) (0.051) (0.052)




Observations 6,054 6,054 2,086 2,086 6,054 6,054
Wald chi2(26) 492.73
Chi-squared 1,364.31 1,450.21 492.73 6,322.09 6,274.78
SHARE 2004, 2006. All columns present marginal eﬀects.
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) present sample selection model results.
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